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THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

and to show the sentiments we so profoundly entertain towards
him; now.
"THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, By the faculty of
Law, now here for the first time assembled to pay honor and
reverence to Col. Hoynes, that one night each year be set apart,
preferably in the second semester, for a reception to the venerable founder of the law school, and for such exercises as may
be appropriate to be known as "Hoynes Night," and that such
anniversary shall be observed as a permanent function in the life
of the College of Law.
"BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED; That a copy of these resolutions be furnished to Col. Hoynes, to TnE NoTRE DAME LAWYER,

and to the other university publications."

BOOK REVIEWS
By George P. Costigan,
St. Paul: West Publishing

SELECT CASES on the LAw of TRUSTS.

Jr. American Casebook Series.
Company. 1925. pp. xxii, 1017.

This new casebook has been long expected, for Professor
Costigan is thorough in his thoughts and prolific with his pen
and was bound to evolve his own pedagogical scheme for the
great subject of trusts. Whether this scheme will be especially useful to other teachers isanother and a personal matter.
The reviewer has attempted the course on both 44 and 64 lecture-hours, and has found it impossible to cover all of Professor
Scott's 836 pages; the 1000 pages provided by Professor Costigan will need extensive trimming.
In the general choice of topics, the immortal Dean Ames,
taestoo of both Scott and Costigan, has been followed. The order
and arrangement of topics has been greatly changed; a matter
of slight practical import since each teacher epecially arranges
his order of topics and cases in using any casebook. The placing of the elements of a trust and the creation of a trust hnder
the single head of "elements" seems a happy plan, pince they
are logically handled at the same time by either student or lawyer in analyzing a new set of facts. It seems that the Statute
of Frauds and the Statute of Wills also belong in the same place
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with the problem of creation, but Professor Costigan has there
differed from Professor Scott and allows three chapters to intervene before the two statutes are introduced. It is strange that
a problem is first solidified and then scattered.
Placing resulting and 'constructive trusts at the end of the
book is a plan already followed by this reviewer. If the rights,
powers, and duties of trustee and cestui are covered at the end of
express trusts, the student has a complete idea which makes
easier reading of the difficult cases on trusts imposed by law.
This does not do too great a violence to logic, as at the end of
the course the student may be directed so to arrange his review
that the type of trust under his facts in examination or in practice will be fully examined and determined first, before testing
the duties and rights thereunder.
The great majority of cases printed as the main text are
rather recent, and are well chosen. The notes are profuse and
excellent, quoting enough matter on each side of a controversy
to force the advanced student still to do his own thinking.
EDWIN W. HADLEY.

Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.

THE GROWTH OF THE LAW. By Benjamin N. Cardozo. New
Haven: Yale University Press. 1924. pp. 145.

It has been estimated that more than 25,000 cases are being
reviewed annually by the various appellate courts throughout
the country. Although no two of these cases are exactly alike
in their facts, yet enough are of such similarity in character that
the same principles of law are relevant. From a study of these
reported cases the student is expected to induce some general
principles, which are called law. This is not an easy task, when
we realize that for almost every principle there is a conflict of
authqrity. Different courts, 1confronted with identical facts,
reach conclusions diametrically opposite. And single courts
will often reverse themselves. What is solemnly affirmed to
be law one day for one pair of litigants, will upon mature consideration, be declared error the next. Thus, at the present time,
law is anything but certain. Precedents may be cited to a court
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for it to consider, but it is in no way duty bound to follow them.
Attention will be given to earlier decisions, but if to a judge
in a later case-either in the same jurisdiction or in another-the
adjudicated cases seem to have been decided erroneously, they
will be reversed. What is law in Illinois may not be law in
Indiana; and what was law in Illinois in 1922 may not be .so in
1926.
In view of all these contradictions, of what may law be said
to consist? In the effort to formulate a reply, two conflicting
doctrines have arisen. .. One group of writers maintain, rather
pessimistically, that law is.merely a ",succession of particulars,"
that each case is of little value except to furnish the parties immediately concerned with a rule of action; that it exerts no influence upon subsequent cases. Obviously this theory is erroneous, for despite the many conflicts among the decisions,
there does appear at least the semblance of uniformity.
The settlement of a dispute does not depend entirely upon the
personal belief of the court. A judgment does not arise spontaneously from the mind of the judge rendering it. There is
some kind of an abiding principle, manifesting itself in the chain
of decisions.
Therefore, declares Judge Cardozo, we must discard this
definition as a possible solution of our difficulties. Yet, in denying such a doctrine, we must be careful not to accept as the
only alternative, the theory which takes us to the other extreme,
and teaches us that law is something positive and certain-that
for every set of facts, there is a corresponding rule, immutable
and eternal. Although the law is more than the whim of the
presiding judge, it most assuredly is not the expression
of the absolute. The certainty of the moral law cannot be postulated of the human law. Courts are not infallible, and do not
pretend to voice a decision that is correct beyond the possibility of doubt. Courts are not endowed with the superhuman
faculty of knowing absolutely what is right, and what is wrong.
Progress brings different ideas regarding the morality of an
act, and one generation may sanction what the previous one
condemned. A decision, once enunciated, does not render subsequent controversy useless. Although the law is something
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more than a collection of individual rules, yet it is something
less than a catalogue of absolute rights.
Both of the above doctrines are thoroughly analysed in
"The Growth of The Law," and both are rejected. Yet in rejecting, Judge Cardozo constructs also, and evQlves a doctrine
that can hardly be said to be wrong. After prefacing his definition of law with an exposition of the need for a restatement, he
defines law as "that body of principle and dogma which with a
reasonable measure of probability may be predicted as the basis
for judgment in pending or future controversies. When the
prediction reaches a high degree of certainty or assurance, we
speak of the law as settled, though, no matter how great the
apparent settlement, the possibility of error in prediction is always present. When the prediction does not reach so high a
standard, we speak of the law as doubtful or uncertain. Farther
down is the vanishing point where law does not exist, and must
be brought into being, if at all, by an act of free creation."
Of course, this "collection of dogma and principle" has its
source in reason. Certain forces must be obeyed. These forces
are divided into four classifications: logic, or analogy; history,
or the method of evolution; custom, which acquaints us with
tradition; and the force of justice, with its expression in the
method of sociology. When these forces are combined and
applied with care to a given controversy there will emerge a rule
which will be reasonable and fair. In this way the quality of
an act may be judged, not with certainty, true, but with some
degree of assurance that the conclusion will be correct.
But we have not reached the ultimate answer yet. A case
may be decided according to what the court considers custom,
for instance, but the court might have erred in construing the
pertinency of the custom. "Custom" is not an absolute term; it
is not easily apprehended. What may appear to be tradition to
one court may not appear so to another. Doubtlessly, one is
wrong-but which? Here the study of values is brought into
play, and the end is near. A thorough knowledge of axiology, as
the study of the estimate of comparative values in ethical, social,
and aestheic problems is called, is indispensable. Appreciation
of the merits of contending theories must be had. Philosophy
is the basis of all law. We must learn how to recognize what
is wrong, and what is right. Recourse to some sound system
of ethics is necessary.
Judge Cardozo's analysis of the law is keen. The development of his subject is logical, clear, and natural, and the truth
of his conclusion cannot be denied.

